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J u x t a p o s it io n  in  E n v ir o n m e n t a l  H ealth  
R h e t o r ic : Ex p o s in g  A s b e s t o s  C o n t a m in a t io n  
in  L ib b y , M o n t a n a
S teve S chw arze
This essay argues that juxtaposition is an im portant rhetorical convention for over­
coming uncertainty and institutional inertia in relation to environmental health haz­
ards. The essay illustrates the rhetorical dynamics o f this convention in the public 
discourse that exposed the problem o f asbestos contamination in Libby, M ontana, and 
contends that the dichotomous moral fram ing o f  this problem was an effective and 
morally appropriate example o f  “ecospeak.”
L ibby, Montana, is the site of what one Environmental Protection Agency official has called “the most severe hum an exposure to a hazardous material this coun­
try has ever seen.”1 Over two hundred hum an deaths have been attributed to a ver- 
miculite mining operation that ran for most of the twentieth century outside of 
Libby. Vermiculite was a lucrative ore for the companies that owned the mine, but 
it was a death sentence for mine workers: the deposit is laced with tremolite, an 
especially toxic form of asbestos that has been linked to elevated levels of asbesto- 
sis, lung cancer, and mesothelioma. At one point during the operation of the mine, 
company records reported that 92 percent of the mine’s long-term workers had lung 
abnormalities related to asbestos exposure.2
Miners’ families also are suffering from asbestos-related disease. For decades 
workers would come home with clothes covered in asbestos dust, and wives and 
children would breathe the toxic fibers. It is not surprising that this type of expo­
sure to asbestos occurred. W. R. Grace, the company that operated the mine from 
1963 until its closure in 1990, did not provide changing rooms for the workers until 
the mid-1970s, and decided in 1983 that adding a shower room  to their facilities 
would not be cost-effective.3 A recent public health screening conducted in Libby by 
the U.S. Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR) revealed the 
extent of this exposure: fully 25 percent of those who lived with mine workers have 
pleural or interstitial lung abnormalities related to asbestos exposure.4
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Beyond that, even residents who never worked at the mine or lived with those 
who did are showing signs of asbestos-related disease. This is likely due to the fact 
that environmental exposure to asbestos is pervasive in Libby; ATSDR researchers 
have identified 18 pathways of exposure to asbestos in the Libby area. For example, 
the processing of vermiculite released dust into the air containing as much as five 
thousand pounds of asbestos per day, and vermiculite with traces of asbestos was 
used throughout the town for insulation in homes, for soil conditioner in gardens, 
and for fill in schoolyards, ball fields, and skating rinks. These environmental expo­
sures are the likely cause of astonishing public health statistics. The ATSDR found 
that in one 20-year period the rates of mortality from asbestosis in the Libby area 
were 40 to 60 times higher than in a normal U.S. population.5 In addition, the pub­
lic health screening found that approximately 18 percent of all participants x-rayed 
had abnormalities in the lining of their lungs, compared to pleural abnormality 
rates of 0.2 to 2 percent among populations that do not have work-related asbestos 
exposure.
These statistics documenting the pervasiveness of asbestos-related disease leave 
little doubt that Libby is the site of a serious environmental health problem. 
Moreover, documents from W. R. Grace and state and federal agencies also leave lit­
tle doubt that this problem could have been averted. Company and government 
officials knew several things about asbestos hazards in Libby as early as the mid- 
1950s but did little to eliminate those hazards:
• They knew the vermiculite deposit contained asbestos, and that asbestos dust 
is toxic.6
• They knew that processing vermiculite released amounts of asbestos into the 
workplace that often exceeded maximum allowable concentration levels.7
• They knew that significant percentages of workers had lung abnormalities,8 
and that workers in Libby and at locations that processed Libby vermiculite 
were getting sick from diseases related to asbestos exposure.9
• And they knew that if information about asbestos exposure resulting from the 
processing of Libby vermiculite or the use of vermiculite products were to 
become public knowledge, the company could face significant financial costs, 
both from the threat of lawsuits and from declining product sales.10
In spite of this knowledge, public officials in multiple government agencies failed 
to act on this knowledge, and thus failed in their duty to regulate corporate activity 
and protect the health of workers and citizens.11 Early reports of the problem in 
Libby highlight the role of government inaction. The newspaper article that first 
brought national attention to the Libby situation, written by Andrew Schneider in 
the November 18, 1999, issue of the Seattle Post-Intelligencer, encapsulates the situ­
ation in this way: “The story of Libby, Mont., is the story of the monumental, even 
unforgivable, failure of government at all levels to protect its people from corporate
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misdeeds that at best were neglectful and insensitive and at worst were dishonest, 
immoral and criminal.”12 Subsequent articles by Schneider draw further attention 
to government failure in Libby, as does the rhetoric of citizen activists and even 
some government officials. Thus, while W. R. Grace rightfully gets targeted in pub­
lic discourse as the party responsible for this problem, government agencies also 
face criticism for their acts of omission.
The story of Libby is not unlike other stories about other environmental health 
struggles. Indeed, the dramatic elements of the situation in Libby—innocent vic­
tims, a deceptive corporation, and an ineffective bureaucracy—resonate with other 
public narratives about toxic exposure. The Love Canal story of the late 1970s, the 
book and movie A  Civil Action (also starring W. R. Grace) and Erin Brockovich offer 
similar tales about issues of power and politics that communities confront when 
trying to address toxic contamination situations. Rhetorically, these popular narra­
tives of civic engagement with unresponsive government agencies and callous cor­
porations provide a framework for interpreting events and making moral 
judgments. In particular, they provide a dramatic structure in which a rhetoric of 
stark oppositions, simplification, and m oral outrage— what M. Jimmie 
Killingsworth and Jacqueline S. Palmer call “ecospeak”13— can be viewed as a justi­
fiable response to corporate and governmental disregard for environmental health 
concerns.
Such responses are precisely what led public institutions to address asbestos 
problems in Libby. In this essay, I show how resident voices and investigative jour­
nalism combined to produce a powerful public discourse that provoked institu­
tional engagement with the environmental and health conditions in Libby. I 
describe and analyze the rhetorical conventions that emerge in this discourse, 
explaining how a rhetoric of exposure operates to influence meaning and action in 
this environmental health controversy. Specifically, I argue that juxtaposition is a 
central rhetorical feature of this discourse that helps overcome key obstacles to 
engagement with the problem. Juxtaposition contextualizes different forms of 
knowledge about the situation, altering the dynamics of certainty and uncertainty 
surrounding the situation; and it heightens moral outrage, generating pressure on 
public institutions to act. In my view, the juxtapositions in the Libby rhetoric can 
be judged as an effective and ethical mode of rhetorical engagement.
To pursue these objectives, my analysis focuses on a set of texts that exposed the 
asbestos problem in Libby and oriented initial public discussion. These texts include 
Schneider’s series of articles in the Seattle Post-Intelligencer (hereafter referred to as P- 
I) from mid-November 1999, which first brought national attention to the Libby sit­
uation, and the transcript of a public hearing held by the Montana Department of 
Environmental Quality (DEQ) on December 1,1999, in Libby. To provide contextual 
information, I have relied on other local, regional, and national newspaper accounts, 
magazine articles, W. R. Grace memos, and government documents pertaining to the
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situation. I have chosen to treat Schneider’s articles and the public hearing as a rela­
tively unified object of rhetorical analysis. In this situation, residents’ comments and 
investigative reports share the same rhetorical purpose— exposing the existence and 
consequences of asbestos contamination— and address the same audiences— the gen­
eral public and institutional decision makers. Moreover, because I am interested in 
conceptualizing juxtaposition as a rhetorical convention rather than in explaining the 
operation of a particular text, my approach to the texts foregrounds their similarities 
and downplays their differences. In this regard, my approach is akin to what James 
Jasinski has called “conceptually-oriented criticism.”14
O b s t a c l e s  t o  E x p o s u r e : M a t e r ia l  U n c e r t a in t y  a n d  
In s t it u t io n a l  In e r t ia
The main rhetorical obstacles faced by those addressing the situation in Libby are 
uncertainty about material conditions and relationships and inertia on the part of 
institutions responsible for investigating and addressing those conditions. These 
obstacles are characteristic of environmental health controversies, and as rhetorical 
scholars have noted, they present a daunting challenge for advocates trying to estab­
lish relationships between environmental degradation and human health. For exam­
ple, Killingsworth and Palmer observe how advocates such as Rachel Carson, Paul 
Ehrlich, and Lois Gibbs get labeled “hysterical” on account of their provocative artic­
ulations of environmental problems to human health issues.15 The charge of hysteria 
is used to insinuate that such linkages are figments of the imagination, illusions of 
certainty driven by raw emotion or sheer ideology. However, Killingsworth and 
Palmer argue that from a psychoanalytic perspective, these hysterical rhetorics can be 
interpreted productively as the return of repressed knowledge of environmental 
degradation. As they remark, “If the fervor of environmentalism seems irrational, 
that is because, in the view of the environmentalists, an ostensibly rational public dis­
course has neglected the signs of trouble for so long that only a cry of pain can break 
the public habit of inattention.”16 Exposing environmental health problems, then, 
may demand provocative forms of rhetoric to garner public attention and puncture 
the prevailing assumption that no problems exist. Advocates face a significant rhetor­
ical challenge, then, in overcoming scientific and public uncertainty about possible 
material relationships between environmental degradation and human health.
In addition to the obstacle of material uncertainty, environmental health advo­
cates often face the related obstacle of institutional inertia. For example, Phaedra 
Pezzullo explores the strategies of environmental justice advocates in Warren 
County, North Carolina, whose rhetorical efforts prodded the state to clean up a 
local toxic landfill.17 Pezzullo shows how residents “critically interrupt” the dom i­
nant success-story narrative about environmental activism in Warren County and 
open the possibility for a new conclusion to those narratives, one that would
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include environmental cleanup. In this case, advocates faced the obstacle of institu­
tional inertia and invoked an earlier promise of cleanup made by the governor in 
order to hold the state accountable and provoke institutional action. Similarly, 
Caitlin Wills Toker examines strategies of the comic frame used by Lisa Crawford, 
whose advocacy helped overcome institutional resistance to community concerns 
about cleanup of a former nuclear weapons facility in Fernald, Ohio. Toker’s analy­
sis shows how Crawford’s rhetoric functioned to expose the “unjust, irrational and 
unfair nature”18 of institutional practices and to generate new forms of negotiation 
and engagement between residents and institutional decision makers.
These studies, then, identify two key rhetorical obstacles faced by advocates 
when attempting to expose environmental health controversies: material uncer­
tainty and institutional inertia. Scholars from a variety of disciplines confirm that 
these obstacles are typical features of environmental contamination situations. 
Regarding uncertainty, environmental psychologist Michael R. Edelstein explains, 
“Local environmental disasters are inherently fraught with uncertainty. The pollu­
tion is not easily identified nor are its characteristics easily described.”19 Sociologists 
Phil Brown, Steve Kroll-Smith, and Valerie J. Gunter concur in finding an “endemic 
presence of uncertain knowledge” in controversies surrounding environmental 
contamination and disease: “From the clinical literature on environments and dis­
eases to the social science literature, the problem of knowing is never very far from 
the center of the discussion.”20 And political scientist Sylvia Noble Tesh shows how 
grassroots groups consistently enlist the support of “environmentalist” scientists to 
challenge the claims of uncertainty by government and industry scientists about 
environmental effects on hum an health.21
Both of these obstacles establish conditions that are ripe for rhetorical interven­
tion. First, to the extent that rhetoric emerges to influence judgment under condi­
tions of uncertainty, it can serve several im portant functions in environmental 
health controversies. It can establish certainty on some issues, expose uncertainty 
on others, and promote or thwart courses of action based on those certainties and 
uncertainties. Second, rhetorical intervention can help overcome the obstacle of 
institutional inertia on environmental health issues. In some instances, the obsta­
cles of uncertainty and inertia are inextricably intertwined; the lack of certainty 
about contamination may result from institutional failure to investigate environ­
mental conditions or act on citizen complaints. Even when a problem is apparent, 
institutions may not prioritize the problem as significant and may not consider the 
problem their responsibility to address. In these instances, rhetoric can function as 
a force for overcoming institutional inertia, motivating officials to take action with 
regard to some problem.
The combination of material uncertainty and institutional inertia constrains 
environmental health advocates in specific, characteristic ways. Uncertainty about 
material conditions can lead advocates to call on personal experience, which often
3 1 8 R h e t o r ic  &  P u b l ic  A f f a ir s
gets discredited by public officials who prefer to base action on “the facts.”22 
Similarly, an overreliance on personal experience can lead advocates to make 
unwarranted generalizations, what Lawrence Buell calls “a rhetoric of unequivocal 
assertion” in which citizen claims are buoyed more by moral outrage than by data 
and leave themselves open to charges of hysteria.23 Institutional inertia also con­
strains rhetorical intervention. Victims and agency officials tend to perceive toxic 
situations from very different perspectives; as Edelstein suggests, “controversy is 
inherent in the relationship of toxic victims to their institutional context because 
there are differences in the way citizens and technocrats view risk.”24 Due to these 
competing perceptions and discourses of risk, citizens often find themselves frus­
trated in their efforts to engage public institutions. In Edelstein’s view, “It is the real­
ization that they cannot depend on government to solve their problems that often 
spurs the contaminated community’s residents to collective action aimed at forcing 
a solution.”25 Indeed, citizens have found some success in overcoming these obsta­
cles. As Fred Setterberg and Lonny Shavelson state, residents “have grappled with 
the uncertainties of science, pressed up hard against a resistant political establish­
ment, and overcome their own lack of confidence and entitlement to speak out for 
commonsense solutions to complex, often immobilizing problems.”26
The Libby situation provides an exemplar of how advocates effectively addressed 
material uncertainty and institutional inertia to spur investigation of ongoing envi­
ronmental and health problems. Advocates in Libby were able to reverse the dynam­
ics of uncertainty typical of m ost environm ental health controversies by 
demonstrating the pervasiveness of asbestos-related diseases among miners and 
their families. From those grounds, advocates had a powerful basis from which they 
could generate moral outrage at W. R. Grace and government agencies for their role 
in perpetuating exposure, and a compelling rationale for demanding that agencies 
address ongoing environmental exposure. Juxtaposition was a prim ary rhetorical 
convention in this process.
J u x t a p o s it io n  a n d  t h e  R h e t o r ic  o f  E x p o s u r e
The exposure of both material conditions and institutional inaction forms what I 
will call a rhetoric of exposure. This is a rhetoric of exposure both in form and in 
content. Formally, the rhetoric functions to expose problems, and the content or 
subject matter of those problems concerns residents’ exposure to asbestos. The pu r­
poses of this rhetoric are to establish certainty about past exposure and institutional 
failure, generate uncertainty about ongoing exposure, and ultimately motivate 
action by state institutions. Across its manifestations in specific texts, this rhetoric 
relies upon the contrast between victims’ knowledge of asbestos exposure and ill­
ness, and statements of officials from W. R. Grace and government officials about 
the extent of their knowledge of asbestos hazards.
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The juxtaposition of these pieces of evidence is the central rhetorical convention 
of the discourses that exposed the asbestos problem in Libby. By juxtaposition, I 
mean the placement of apparently conflicting or contradicting pieces of evidence in 
close proximity to one another. With this definition, I align my notion of juxtapo­
sition with the strategy identified by Anne Teresa Demo and Kimberly A. Powell in 
their analyses of social change rhetoric.27 Juxtaposition creates the appearance of an 
incongruity between symbolic characterizations of reality, and it encourages audi­
ences to take sides and make judgments in order to resolve the incongruity. As ear­
lier research demonstrates, juxtaposition may operate in a liberatory or hegemonic 
fashion;28 thus, it is im portant to continue examining instances of juxtaposition to 
further understand its rhetorical functions.
In relation to Libby, juxtaposition functions effectively to recontextualize insti­
tutional discourses and (in)actions, opening those discourses to questions and call­
ing (in)actions into question. Residents and journalists juxtaposed institutional 
knowledge claims with evidence of past asbestos exposure to render institutional 
knowledge uncertain. Thus, as Demo illustrates in her analysis of the Guerrilla 
Girls, juxtaposition “exposes . . .  hypocrisies” and can function to “critique . . .  insti­
tutions.”29 The Libby rhetoric confirms these functions and illustrates how juxta­
position can help reverse the dynamics of uncertainty that are typical of 
environmental health controversies.
Further, juxtaposition functions to highlight the moral dimension of public con­
troversies. This is the case in Libby, and it is especially characteristic of the two types 
of discourse I analyze here, investigative journalism and advocacy about toxicity. 
Other scholars have noted that these types of discourse can hardly avoid giving 
moral meaning to factual evidence. In both, moral meanings can be generated as 
the juxtaposition of evidence—words, actions, personal experience, expert testi­
mony, official documents, and the like— helps to establish protagonists and antag­
onists in controversies. For example, regarding discourse about toxicity, Buell has 
argued that one of its chief characteristics is “the moral passion of a battle between 
David and Goliath.”30 For Buell, this m otif aligns the interests of workers and citi­
zens against forces of capitalist development, using a “strategy of channeling com­
munal hostility by linking environmental reform with social justice against ‘the 
common enemy’ of corporate greed.”31 Similarly, in investigative journalism, the 
David/Goliath m otif resonates with the rhetorical constitution of “villainy and vic­
timization” as identified by communication scholars James S. Ettema and Theodore 
L. Glasser.32 These authors interpret investigative news stories as rhetorical con­
structions that, like advocacy about toxicity, function as a powerful form of public 
moral discourse. These stories rely on two im portant rhetorical features: “the inno­
cence of those good citizens who have been victimized by some systemic problem, 
and the guilt of those reprehensible lords of civic vice (often, though not always, 
bureaucrats) who have caused the problem or else failed to address it.”33 Through
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the juxtaposition of victims and villains, stories begin to take on a moral meaning; 
events get framed “not merely as an example of a systemic problem but as a moral 
outrage.”34 Thus, juxtaposition provides the formal structure for developing both 
the David/Goliath and victim/villain themes, producing a moral framework for 
understanding unacknowledged environmental health problems.
The juxtapositions in the Libby rhetoric present a useful case for rethinking the 
moral implications of particular rhetorical conventions. As noted above, juxtaposi­
tion can be understood as an example of perspective by incongruity. In Denise M. 
Bostdorff’s words, “perspective by incongruity involves altering an orientation or 
expectation by viewing an incongruity, which is inconsistent or not in agreement.”35 
The Libby rhetoric exemplifies this concept, as public discourse consistently 
attempts to alter orientations toward institutional discourse (claims made by W. R. 
Grace or government officials) by juxtaposing the latter with conflicting evidence.36 
In Libby, as in other cases, perspective by incongruity foregrounds the dominant 
discourse used to characterize some situation and then views the situation from 
another perspective, serving to “‘remoralize’ by accurately naming a situation 
already demoralized by inaccuracy.”37
Juxtaposition, then, can serve a socially beneficial purpose to the extent that it 
remoralizes a situation. The rhetoric that exposes the Libby situation does exactly 
this. The stark oppositions and clear moral lines drawn by the rhetoric surround­
ing Libby helped to accurately name a situation that for decades had gone 
unnamed. Consequently, the juxtapositions illustrated here provide an example of 
“ecospeak” that is productive and commendable.
J u x t a p o s it io n  in  In v e s t ig a t iv e  J o u r n a l is m : “ U n c iv il  A c t io n ”
The rhetoric of exposure is most apparent in the narratives that juxtapose the state­
ments and actions of W. R. Grace and government officials against concrete exam­
ples of sick miners, personal testimony from former mine workers and their family 
members, and expert testimony from doctors. Schneider’s “Uncivil Action” series in 
the November 18 and 19 editions of the Seattle Post-Intelligencer provides several 
examples of how journalistic narratives employ multiple forms of evidence to con­
struct an article that constitutes certainty about “the facts” of the situation and 
arranges those facts in a way that summons moral outrage over institutional failure.
Schneider’s introduction in the main P-I article of November 18 frames the sit­
uation in terms of “killing” and amplifies the facts of knowledge and inaction to 
generate a clear set of victims and villains:
First, it killed some miners.
Then, it killed wives and children, slipping into their homes on the dusty clothing 
of hard-working men. Now the mine is closed, but in Libby, the killing goes on. The
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W. R. Grace Co. knew, from the time it bought the Zonolite vermiculite mine in 1963, 
why the people in Libby were dying. But for the 30 years it owned the mine, the com­
pany did not stop it.
Neither did the governments.
Not the town of Libby, not Lincoln County. Not the state of Montana, not federal 
mining, health and environmental agencies, not anyone else charged with protecting 
the public health.38
This introduction ends with the quotation in which Schneider characterizes the 
story as the “monumental failure” of government to protect citizens from “corpo­
rate misdeeds.” This broad framing of “the story of Libby” immediately identifies 
the victims and villains in the story, with government’s role falling somewhere out­
side of this dichotomy. That role is clarified in the November 19 article; the 
November 18 article focuses primarily on W. R. Grace.
The moral stance of the “killing” narrative that opens the November 18 article is 
supported by the juxtaposition of numerical evidence and medical testimony with 
a statement by a W. R. Grace official. Schneider states that the paper’s investigation
has shown that at least 192 people have died from the asbestos in the mine’s vermi­
culite ore, and doctors say the toll could be much higher. The doctors and Libby’s 
long-suffering families say that at least another 375 people have been diagnosed with 
fatal diseases caused by this silent and invisible killer. Dr. Alan Whitehouse, a lung spe­
cialist from Spokane and an expert in industrial diseases, said another 12 to 15 people 
from Libby are being diagnosed with the diseases—asbestosis, mesothelioma, lung 
cancer—every month.39
Schneider juxtaposes these numbers and doctor claims with the company’s dis­
course: “The W. R. Grace Co. says it did no harm. ‘Obviously we feel we met our 
obligation to our workers and to the community,’ said Jay Hughes, Grace’s senior 
litigation counsel.” The juxtaposition of the weighty numerical evidence and m ed­
ical testimony with Hughes’s self-satisfied comments encourages audiences to inter­
pret skeptically the claim that W. R. Grace had met its obligation. Coupled with the 
initial narrative, the notion that Libby’s families have been “long-suffering” and that 
their diseases were caused by a “silent and invisible killer,” this juxtaposition under­
scores the innocence of victims and characterizes Grace as an unsympathetic cor­
poration.
The villainy of W. R. Grace is strengthened by the story of Helen Bundrock’s 
family. It is the first personal narrative we see in the article, and it functions almost 
as a representative anecdote of the Libby situation. The section is entitled “A 
Family’s Nightmare,” a fitting frame given the fact that “six of the family’s seven 
members have been diagnosed with asbestos-related disease.” Schneider uses
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Helen’s words to describe her late husband Art’s pain— from the disease and from 
the knowledge that he brought home asbestos dust to his family. Then, the article 
moves toward Helen’s indictment of W. R. Grace, in which Helen juxtaposes the 
words and actions of the company with the effects on her son.
She said that managers at the mine told miners that the dust was harmless— a claim 
echoed by other miners and denied by W. R. Grace. “They lied, but they did worse than 
that,” she said, talking about when her son, now 46, went to work for Grace. “Bill had 
to get a chest X-ray before they hired him. That X-ray showed he had asbestosis and 
they never told him. They just let him go to work up there with all that poison. They 
never told him for the 10 years he worked there.”40
Helen’s account depicts W. R. Grace as lying, which is corroborated by Schneider’s 
insertion that this claim was corroborated by miners and denied by Grace. 
Moreover, W. R. Grace’s villainy comes not only from lying about specific facts, but 
in maintaining that lie over time, perhaps over the stretch of multiple managers 
such that Grace the company is to blame, not a particular person. Finally, this jux­
taposition heightens the innocence of the victim, who did not know he was sick and 
yet was knowingly exposed to “all that poison.” In this anecdote, then, the juxtapo­
sition of the company’s words and actions with the ultimate effects on human 
health work rhetorically to heighten outrage toward W. R. Grace and emphasize the 
innocence of the victim.
The latter half of the article juxtaposes several types of evidence within a narra­
tive to establish detailed facts about knowledge of asbestos hazards and further gen­
erate moral outrage at mining companies and government agencies. Noting first 
that the paper “examined 6,000 pages” of documents and “interviewed 110 people” 
with connections to the mine, Schneider then places multiple pieces of evidence in 
proximity to one another. He says that in 1956 the Montana Board of Health 
reported that “asbestos dust in the air is of considerable toxicity,” and that two and 
a half years later, the board’s follow-up report listed four single-spaced pages of 
deficiencies and repeated a warning that inhalation of asbestos dust would lead to 
asbestosis. These statements from government reports are followed with the fact of 
the first diagnosis of asbestosis in a Libby miner (Glenn Taylor) in 1959, and testi­
mony from another miner (Les Skramstad) describing work he was directed to do 
at the mine involving raw asbestos. By juxtaposing this firsthand evidence from 
miners with the state’s discourse, the narrative suggests that miners were working 
with asbestos and getting sick from it even as the State of Montana was telling the 
company that their asbestos dust was a health hazard.
This juxtaposition of worker exposure to asbestos with institutional knowledge 
of asbestos becomes more appalling with a subsequent example of what W. R. Grace 
knew about asbestos and disease. First, we see the words of a 1969 internal Grace
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report that states “tremolite is definitely a health hazard.” Then, we read the state­
ment of a local doctor whose examination of x-rays found ‘“a great deal of lung 
abnormalities among the employees . . .  far in excess of what one would find in 
examining the normal population.’” This movement back and forth between a vari­
ety of forms of evidence— government reports, miners’ evidence, company docu­
ments, medical statements— allows Schneider to generate a compelling account of 
factual knowledge that W. R. Grace had about asbestos problems at the Libby mine. 
The account composes a set of consistent signs of asbestos hazards, fortifying the 
appearance of certainty about those hazards. Moreover, these consistent signs show 
that W. R. Grace officials certainly knew of the hazards.
This constitution of certainty about asbestos hazards implies a moral judgment. 
The overall narrative depicts several instances in which W. R. Grace knew of the 
problem but neither acted to protect workers nor told workers about their own 
medical condition. W. R. Grace was in the wrong because they knew of the asbestos 
problems, knew of the related health problems, and failed to disclose this knowl­
edge or to act upon it. Through the consistent set of juxtapositions in this story, W. 
R. Grace gets framed as a villain, and miners such as Taylor and Skramstad as 
unknowing, innocent victims. This moral judgment emerges implicitly from the 
organization of evidence from multiple voices in the story and is supported explic­
itly by an outside source, Grace’s insurance company. Schneider cites a 1969 letter 
from Maryland Casualty to W. R. Grace that states, “Certainly when an X-ray pic­
ture shows a change for the worse, that person must be told. . . .  Failure to do so is 
not humane and is in direct violation of federal law.”41 This evidence shows that it 
is not merely Schneider’s personal moral judgment intruding on the story, but that 
others raise the issue of moral obligation as well as legal transgression. Thus, the 
rhetoric of exposure flows seamlessly from factual knowledge to moral judgments, 
offering readers a solid basis for criticism of W. R. Grace.42
Alongside the exposure of W. R. Grace, the rhetoric of the Libby situation also 
criticizes government agencies that knew of problems but took little preventive or 
investigative action. The government angle is at the heart of the November 19 P-I 
article, and is echoed in accounts in the Missoula (Montana) Missoulian and much 
later articles in the New York Times that focus specifically on the EPA. Schneider’s 
November 19 article displays conventions similar to those of the previous day’s 
story, juxtaposing comments from local, state, and federal agencies with firsthand 
testimony of Libby residents who have asbestos-related health problems.
The November 19 headline signals the basic juxtaposition at work in 
Schneider’s article: “While people are dying, government agencies pass buck.”43 
The article’s movement between the words of asbestos victims and the statements, 
actions, and inactions of government agencies makes clear how hum an lives have 
been damaged by the institutions that are supposed to serve them. Schneider’s 
framing of the problem blunts the villainy of any specific agency, however, and
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instead indicts government as a whole. The story of Libby, again, is a story of sys­
temic institutional failure to address an environmental health problem.
The lead of the article emphasizes the buck-passing noted in the story’s headline, 
playing upon a commonsense distinction between words and actions.
They all say somebody should do something.
City, county, state and federal officials agree that someone should follow up. 
Inquire. Ask questions about the hundreds of people from Libby who have either died 
or been diagnosed with fatal diseases after being exposed to tremolite asbestos from a 
vermiculite mine.
Somebody, they say, should investigate disturbing indications that Libby may still 
be at risk. But every official and every agency has a reason why, so far, they have not 
been that somebody.44
This framing of the problem sets the stage for two im portant features of the rest of 
the article: results of soil and air samples taken near the mine by the P-I showing 
actionable levels of asbestos, and comments from an array of agency officials dis­
claiming responsibility for asbestos problems. By juxtaposing these comments with 
concrete evidence of potential ongoing asbestos hazards and actual ongoing health 
problems, Schneider’s article constitutes a tension between material conditions and 
institutional inertia that attempts to provoke the indignation of audiences and 
implies that action needs to be taken to adequately address those conditions.
This tension works rhetorically by generating uncertainty about the claims of 
state institutions. In contrast to the construction of W. R. Grace’s and the govern­
m ent’s certain knowledge about past asbestos hazards, the article depicts a current 
situation marked by considerable uncertainty. Early in the article, Schneider states 
that as the death and illness statistics grow,
(S)ome townspeople are finding questions none of the government agencies has 
dared to seek answers for:
• Are the tons of asbestos debris from the mine still killing people?
• Are people being exposed today, breathing in death sentences that will be car­
ried out halfway into the next century, after decades of agonizing illness?
• Are there dangerous levels of asbestos in the air, in the ground, in the waters 
of the Kootenai River?
• Are the children and grandchildren of the sick and dying, who never saw the 
mine in operation, going to die from its legacy?45
After quoting two EPA officials who reviewed the soil samples and confirmed the 
need for further investigation, the article further heightens uncertainty by intro­
ducing a 34-year-old logger, Shane Whitmarsh. He never worked at the mine, but 
he has had pneumonia three times in one year. Whitmarsh is uncertain whether his
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illnesses are related to asbestos; through the voice of his wife, the story implies that 
he is in denial about the source of his persistent illness. However, he does want cer­
tainty about the safety of his children: “That old vermiculite is all over this town. 
Has anyone checked to see what happened to the asbestos that’s part of it? Are our 
kids safe?”46 Through this juxtaposition of asbestos evidence with a resident and his 
unexplained illness, the article adds to the initial questions and bolsters the sense of 
uncertainty about current asbestos exposure.
The article amplifies this uncertainty as it introduces statements from agency 
officials. No agency at any level is able make claims about asbestos in Libby with any 
degree of certainty, and the evasion of responsibility that echoes across the state­
ments suggests that officials have not even tried to resolve uncertainties. Moving 
from the local to the federal level, Schneider quotes a series of officials to illustrate 
the buck-passing of the article’s headline.
First, Tony Berget, Libby’s mayor: “We know what happened in the old days, the 
miners coming home covered with white dust. But I don’t think there’s anything to 
worry about now. If there was a problem, I’m  sure the county or the state people 
would have told us.”
Then, Kendra Lund, a county environmental official who claims the county has­
n’t done any testing for asbestos “for years. We don’t have the facilities to test for 
asbestos fibers. These are not county issues, but state issues.”
The mining supervisor at the Montana Department of Environmental Quality: 
“We keep hearing about all these people from Libby who are sick or have died, but 
no one that I know from the state has any real information.”
A state epidemiologist: “It sounds like the asbestos problem in Libby may have 
fallen between the crack of ‘whose territory is it?”’
Finally, Schneider quotes John Wardell, coordinator of the EPA in Montana: “A 
lot of folks are saying EPA should do this or that, but not one of them, the town, the 
county or the state has written us a letter or called and asked for our help. We can­
not go out there unless we’re invited.”47
Through repetition, these comments amplify the uncertainty about the extent 
and severity of material problems, as well as related uncertainty about institutional 
responsibilities, all of which has led to overall institutional inertia.
As these comments are juxtaposed with the voices of Libby residents who have 
health problems, the uncertainty of state officials takes on moral weight. While 
W hitmarsh’s pneum onia is not clearly linked to asbestos exposure, a more certain 
case follows the comments from an agency official. Carrie Detrick, a 67-year-old 
woman who never worked at the mine, has asbestosis. “‘I just got it by living 
around here. It’s all over the town. . . .  I can’t understand why the government 
doesn’t do anything and why the newspaper doesn’t print a word. It’s like it’s a 
dirty secret that nobody wants to talk about.’”48 The juxtaposition of previous 
statements of institutional uncertainty with residential certainty about the
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pervasiveness of contam ination reveals a moral problem, and Detrick herself 
functions as evidence of the effects of government inaction. Her comments, 
which conclude the article, make the link between institutional uncertainty and 
health effects in a m uch more pointed way. ‘“ If the government says there is n o th ­
ing wrong here, they’re crazy. . . . I’m  going to die. Let the government come to 
my funeral if they need proof.’”49 The certain end that Detrick faces exposes the 
moral failure of the government to protect the residents of Libby and provides a 
powerful impetus for institutional action.
J u x t a p o s it io n  in  R e s id e n t s ’ R h e t o r ic
Carrie Detrick’s comments display how juxtaposition works in the discourse of 
many Libby residents as they address asbestos exposure. Their comments in 
Schneider’s articles and at the public hearing feature juxtaposition as a convention 
that demarcates certainty and uncertainty about asbestos exposure. Moreover, their 
advocacy in the public hearing makes explicit the implicit message of Schneider’s 
articles, as residents address agency officials face-to-face and issue forceful calls for 
action.
The Montana DEQ bond reclamation hearing was held December 1, 1999, in 
Memorial Gymnasium in Libby. In the fall of 1999, the DEQ issued notice that they 
were going to return the remainder of the reclamation bond, $67,000, to the com­
pany that currently owns the mine site.50 This notice prompted Gayla Benefield to 
explore the site herself to see how well it had been reclaimed. At the hearing, 
Benefield spoke about her experience, and her testimony provides a powerful exam­
ple of how juxtaposition affects the rhetorical dynamics of certainty, uncertainty, 
and moral outrage.
Benefield’s testimony juxtaposes public accounts of reclamation efforts with her 
own experiential knowledge to expose both material and institutional problems. She 
begins her testimony by reading a 1993 article from a Libby newspaper about the 
reclamation. The article describes elk and deer roaming in areas that used to have 
mine tailings and heavy equipment on it. The article itself relies on juxtaposition as 
it contrasts depictions of the old mine site with visions of pristine nature—lush 
grass, green meadows, wild deer and elk—to show that reclamation can work. 
Benefield’s reading of the article ends with a quotation from W. R. Grace’s local rep­
resentative Alan Stringer: “‘We have proven that a mine can exist in scenic areas,’ 
Stringer said, ‘and that we can succeed in closing it, removing it from the face of the 
earth.’”51 Grace even received an award for its reclamation efforts. However, 
Benefield counters this account with her personal experience. “I drove up there last 
fall. I was shocked. I drove up, I saw the tailings pile, I saw the pond. It did not match 
everything else. It was nothing but a great big tailings pile going into the water.”52 
Benefield’s personal experience was corroborated by Roger Sullivan, a Kalispell
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lawyer who has hundreds of clients in Libby and who won a case against W. R. Grace 
for the wrongful death of Benefield’s mother. Sullivan’s opening presentation at the 
hearing included comparison photographs of the tailings pile before and after the 
operation of the mine and estimates that there were “approximately five billion 
pounds of asbestos in the tailings pile that we looked at.”53 Reinforced by this evi­
dence, Benefield’s juxtaposition of public accounts and personal experience provides 
a powerful indictment of the proud claims of W. R. Grace officials.
Benefield’s initial juxtaposition exposes the material dimension of the prob­
lem, but she goes on to expose institutional problems of uncertainty and unre­
sponsiveness:
I called the DEQ about it. I saw that a bond was being released. I called the DEQ and 
they had little or no information on it. I called the EPA. There again, they had little or 
no information on it at all. I asked for the DEQ report on it. I read the report. The 
report was full of inconsistencies. What I read you right here is basically what the 
report said. What is actually up there is entirely different.54 
\
Here, Benefield places institutional uncertainty up against the certainty of her per­
sonal experience at the mine site and her personal experience of a “family history 
full of asbestosis.” Given her certainty about past exposure, its link to asbestosis in 
her family, and her experiential knowledge about the mine site, Benefield’s com­
ments provide a solid ground for issuing a demand that DEQ and EPA further 
investigate the situation.
A more personal and stark juxtaposition comes later in the meeting from Pat 
Vinion, whose father worked at the mine and who himself is diagnosed with 
asbestosis. As with Benefield’s comments, Vinion juxtaposes the assurances of safety 
with the tangible effects derived from personal experience.
When my father was a young man they told him that you can’t eat enough of that stuff.
It won’t bother you. Don’t worry about it. Well, he’s dead. When I started feeling sick 
when I was younger they said, you never worked there. It’s not possible. You can’t get 
it that way. You never worked there. Well, it’s more than possible. I am dying from it.55
While Vinion’s comments do not specifically identify the “they” to whom he refers, 
the sharp contrast between conventional wisdom about asbestos and the material 
effects of exposure further builds the case that agency officials do not have certain 
knowledge about asbestos. Therefore, they need to reconsider what they know 
about the relationship between asbestos and hum an health.
Environmental advocates also resisted institutional inertia. Bonnie Gestring, 
spokesperson for the Montana Environmental Information Center, makes explicit 
the implicit indictment of “the system” in Schneider’s articles. Like Benefield and
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Vinion, she questions the assurances made in official discourse by juxtaposing them 
with the fact of exposure, disease, and death. Schneider reports her “angrily” deliv­
ering her remarks.
I got a hand-out when I entered that says that—from the Department that says that it 
is apparent that the State and Federal agencies have worked with W. R. Grace to insure 
the ore processing facilities complied with statutes and standards. And I can’t under­
stand how this can possibly be. How can 300 people—hundreds of people be exposed, 
have asbestosis, have died from this and all the statutes and standards have been com­
plied with?56
Gestring’s question makes plain the incongruity between abstract legal criteria and 
concrete health effects, turning critical scrutiny toward the statutes and standards 
that allowed such an environmental health hazard to go unchecked.
In all these comments, advocates appealed to the certainty of material condi­
tions, both in terms of environmental degradation and hum an health, and juxta­
posed those conditions with official discourses in order to expose the deficiency of 
those discourses, raise uncertainty about ongoing problems, and motivate institu­
tional action. Benefield’s comments expose the environmental hazards still lurking 
in Libby; Vinion’s comments expose the health hazards that can result from envi­
ronmental exposure to asbestos; and Gestring’s comments expose the institutional 
hazards that obscure government recognition of the environmental and health haz­
ards in Libby. Taken together, these comments constitute a powerful force for over­
coming the institutional inertia that advocates had faced for several years.
The comments particularly gain force by generating a sense of moral outrage 
about institutional inertia. To be sure, the moral force of residents’ rhetoric stems 
from the tragic health consequences already occurring in Libby, the sense that those 
problems are likely to grow over several decades, and the possibility that continued 
exposure could harm  children in the community.57 But it is the framing of those 
elements through the convention of juxtaposition that makes their moral character 
emerge and applies moral force to state institutions. The juxtaposition of environ­
mental and health effects with statements from corporate and government actors 
constitutes a sense that W. R. Grace officials have lied to residents, and that govern­
ment agencies have failed in their duties to warn and protect citizens. While the 
State is not villainized to the extent that W. R. Grace is, these juxtapositions con­
tribute to the perception that a moral bond between the State and its citizens has 
been violated, and that the State must act to reestablish that bond.
Schneider’s articles and public comments at the hearing were highly effective in 
jostling state institutions into action. The EPA and ATSDR immediately sent offi­
cials to Libby as a result of Schneider’s articles.58 These officials attended the public 
hearing along with the top six officials of Montana DEQ, several state legislators
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and state health officials, and approximately five hundred residents. Subsequently, 
the federal agencies engaged in extensive environmental testing, health screenings, 
and remedial action that continues today. Ongoing public advocacy by local resi­
dents and persistent media coverage by Schneider and reporters for several 
Montana news outlets persuaded Governor Judy Martz to change her initial posi­
tion that W. R. Grace should clean up Libby. In a surprising decision, Martz 
requested in December 2001 that Libby be given expedited or “silver bullet” prior­
ity for listing on the Superfund National Priorities List. The EPA approved removal 
of Zonolite insulation (made from Libby vermiculite) from houses in Libby, a dra­
matic reversal of long-standing EPA policy that asbestos products should be m an­
aged “in place.” Clearly, public discourse had a significant impact on institutional 
action in Libby.
J u x t a p o s it io n  a n d  E n v ir o n m e n t a l  R h e t o r ic : R e t h in k in g  t h e  
D ic h o t o m ie s  o f  “ E c o s p e a k ”
The preceding analysis demonstrates that the rhetoric surrounding Libby relies 
heavily on juxtaposition to shed light on unacknowledged effects of asbestos expo­
sure and to generate outrage that would pressure institutions to act. Consequently, 
the Libby situation invites reflection on the rhetorical dynamics of juxtaposition. It 
also encourages reconsideration of a central issue in the study of environmental 
rhetoric: the appropriateness of the moralizing, dichotomous rhetoric that 
Killingsworth and Palmer label “ecospeak.”
First, in the Libby rhetoric, juxtaposition recontextualizes institutional dis­
courses and renders them  uncertain. In both Schneider’s articles and public advo­
cacy, various statements of knowledge and assurances of safety by W. R. Grace 
officials and government officials are undermined as they are juxtaposed with the 
firsthand accounts of miners and family members. Their experiences— of exposure, 
disease, and death— provide a compelling contrast to the discourse of established 
institutions. Hence, this study illustrates how rhetorical intervention can expose the 
uncertainties of “official” knowledge and use that exposure as a basis for advocating 
public action.59 Juxtaposition can be an effective rhetorical convention for exposing 
uncertainty.
The case of Libby, then, illustrates how rhetorical intervention can reverse the 
dynamics of the uncertainty that often accompanies environmental health contro­
versies. In this instance, uncertainty functioned less as a negative constraint to be 
overcome through public advocacy, and more as a positive opportunity that could be 
used to motivate public action. The public discourse surrounding Libby reversed the 
dynamics of uncertainty by shifting the burden of proof onto the State, creating the 
need to provide an account as to why they failed to act in the face of clear public 
health problems. Also, it created the need for public agencies to execute studies that
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would resolve their own uncertainty about conditions in Libby. In contrast to other 
environmental health controversies, personal experience was not discredited, in part 
because of the pervasiveness of disease but also because institutions’ prior knowledge 
claims had been debunked. Thus, institutions had little ground from which they 
could effectively counter the claims of residents. Instead, uncertainty at all levels of 
government, juxtaposed with the certainties of disease and death in Libby, put gov­
ernment officials in a position that demanded remedies rather than refutation.
Second, in the Libby rhetoric, juxtaposition generates outrage by creating the 
appearance that a clear moral order has been violated. The moral dimension of this 
rhetoric is most apparent in the Schneider articles, where W. R. Grace is clearly 
positioned as a villain in contrast to victims in Libby. Their victim status is consti­
tuted by juxtaposing the knowledge that W. R. Grace and government officials had 
with the lack of knowledge on the part of miners and residents, and the subsequent 
physical and emotional traumas they have undergone. The moral framing carries 
over into the hearing, too. Advocates pick up on the “government failure” m otif in 
order to influence agency officials to redeem themselves and thereby fulfill their 
moral duty as protectors of public safety. Thus, this study confirms how public dis­
course “realizes” innocence and guilt by rendering accounts of reality that are “intel­
lectually comprehensible and at the same time morally meaningful.”60
The case of Libby, then, illustrates how juxtaposition can structure moral m ean­
ing in a way that pressures institutions to overcome inertia and address previously 
unrecognized environmental health problems. But in doing so, it forces us to con­
front the crucial issue of ecospeak as a mode of environmental rhetoric. One might 
argue that the moral meanings constructed through juxtaposition merely reinforce 
the “oversimplified dichotomy” that Killingsworth and Palmer find characteristic of 
ecospeak.61 Arguably, the binary constructions of David/Goliath and victim/villain 
identified by Buell and by Ettema and Glasser (and found in the Libby rhetoric) are 
precisely the object of Killingsworth and Palmer’s criticism. The latter claim that 
environmental discourse is plagued by a tendency toward an “allegory of good guys 
and bad guys, demanding of the observer a value judgment about the goodness or 
badness of each side” and “a ready-made stock of plots and characters” that fore­
close possibilities for social transformation.62 The rhetoric exposing the situation in 
Libby surely partakes of these tendencies. Moreover, while the juxtaposition of res­
ident voices with official discourses may function as a form of critical rhetoric, it 
also may reify the dichotomy between lay experience and ostensibly scientific dis­
course, branding the former the product of “hysterics” and “troublemakers.”
While dichotomies have their drawbacks, I believe these drawbacks must be con­
sidered in the context of particular situations. Exposing previously unrecognized 
problems may require drawing sharp dichotomies between perpetrators and vic­
tims, between abstract explanations and lived experience, between official rhetoric 
and material reality. The need to avoid dichotomous thinking may be outweighed
E x p o s i n g  A s b e s t o s  C o n t a m i n a t io n  in  L ib b y , M o n t a n a  3 3 1
by the need to gain recognition, provoke outrage, and motivate action. These needs 
can only be weighed in relationship to the specific situation and the sense of advo­
cates that it is time for officials to face the problem and take action.
In some cases, then, the dichotomous moral framing constituted through juxta­
position may be a timely and appropriate gesture, a crucial catalyst for motivating 
action. Libby is one of those cases. Clear identification of distinct identities and 
interests, discrete categories of right and wrong, and glaring distinctions between 
rhetoric and reality were needed in order to overcome the identifications, concor­
dances, and unspoken consensus that prevented public recognition of the problem 
in the first place.
Moreover, the particular style of ecospeak in the Libby rhetoric draws sharp divi­
sions while also cultivating the crucial audience: government officials. Certainly, the 
public hearing explicitly positions these officials as a prim ary audience. But the 
newspaper articles, too, have government as a key audience. Robert Miraldi draws 
attention to this audience in relation to the muckrakers. “What is true today—and 
what was emerging also at the turn  of century—is that government, more than the 
public, responds especially and vigorously to journalistic exposes.”63 Ettema and 
Glasser concur, arguing: “If powerful interests are to be called most fully to account, 
journalists must draw other social institutions, especially government into a dia­
logue—particularly if they are to engage in any discussion of either punishment or 
policy reform. The initial investigative report must generate enough of a charge to 
compel officials to respond.”64 As mentioned earlier, EPA and ATSDR officials 
reported going to Libby as a direct result of Schneider’s series. The moral outrage, 
the obvious regulatory failure, and the challenge to long-standing scientific 
assumptions about asbestos exposure constituted a compelling set of appeals that 
moved elected representatives, agency officials, and scientists to investigate Libby. 
Thus, even as the Libby rhetoric exposed the failures of government, it did so in a 
way that provoked government officials to make up for those failures by aggressively 
engaging the problems in Libby.
To be sure, dichotomous moral framings of environmental controversies can be 
debilitating. But that judgment should be made on a case-by-case basis. Arguably, 
the juxtapositions of the Libby rhetoric did not produce a debilitating case of eco­
speak. Rather, they were an effective and morally appropriate response to environ­
mental injustice.
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